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Abstract 
Although the problem of static electric protection of 
MOS integrated circuits is by no means new, very little 
definitive information is available in the literature on 
this topic. While many models have been proposed for 
testing protection techniques, justification for their 
usage is frequently questionable. 
One of the primary purposes of this paper is to 
present a realistic model of the human body for static 
electric protection purposes. A circuit consisting of a 
150 picofarad capacitor, a 20K ohm series resistor, and an 
ordinary high voltage relay was tested and found to 
closely simulate the human body. In choosing this model, 
several other approaches were discarded because of lack of 
correlation to the actual problem. 
The protection requirements are examined and elec- 
trical, technological, and circuit layout requirements are 
indicated. Failure mechanisms which commonly occur are 
found to be oxide damage, pn junction destruction, and 
metal shorts. 
Various protection schemes are examined both as 
proposed in the literature and as used by several manufac- 
turers, fhe resistor, diode, field plate diode, thick 
field MOS transistor, punch through, gated punch through, 
and spark gap devices are described.   Using the  elec- 
- I - 
trostatic equivalent  circuit described,  samples of the 
above protection schemes were tested and evaluated. 
Results of these tests indicate that the gated punch 
through device, with proper modification and proper 
design, is most effective and versatile for static elec- 
tric protection of MOS integrated circuits. Circuits 
presently protected in this manner typically survive 
discharges from persons charged to two to three kilovolts. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Because MOS devices have input lines insulated from 
circuitry by a dielectric material which is destroyed by 
input voltages on the order of one hundred volts, they 
must be protected from large voltages appearing on these 
lines. Once the circuit is placed in its final operating 
system, it is (or can be) protected by external circuitry'. 
However,, during manufacture, testing, and assembly of 
these devices, they are unavoidably handled by human 
operators—who will inevitably carry a static electric 
charge. This charge can cause permanent damage to the 
device, and, as a result, the device must contain means to 
protect itself against possible static discharge from 
human beings. 
Various protective circuits have been proposed in the 
literature (7,13,16-ld) and many different types have been 
implemented in various manufacturers circuits. However, 
available information on the effectiveness of these 
schemes is very scarce. Moreover, the static environment 
which these networks must protect against is either poorly 
defined or is not defined at all. A justifiable model of 
the human bodyxs interaction with these circuits is not 
readily available. It will therefore be the purpose of 
this paper to provide the necessary information for ac- 
curate testing and protection of an  integrated circuit 
with respect  to exposure to statically charged human 
handlers. 
In defining the problem, an accurate model of the 
human body will be developed and tested. Consideration of 
resistance, body capacitance, and the actual nature of 
discharge into the circuit will be made. Conclusions will 
be drawn regarding the voltage levels, energy delivered, 
and the times during which discharge occurs. In order to 
provide a basis for understanding the requirements of the 
protection devices, mechanisms of destruction and tech- 
nological restrictions will be indicated. 
Using the human electrostatic model, and its conse- 
quent realization as an equivalent circuit, the various 
protection schemes proposed in the literature will be ex- 
amined and their effectiveness will be tested using 
commercially available products. The results of these ex- 
periments will indicate the most effective methods for in- 
tegrated circuit static electric protection, the proper 
methods of implementing them where speed or area require- 
ments are critical, and are intended to provide the basis 
for development of even more effective schemes for future 
use. 
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II .  BODY MODEL 
1.  PURPOSE 
Measurement of the effectiveness of gate protection 
circuits requires the development of an accurate model of 
human charge storage ana discharge characteristics. The 
model is necessary so that various integrated circuit 
protection schemes can be tested and evaluated easily and 
quickly. It is extremely important that the model be 
highly correlated to actual human characteristics, so that 
any results obtained can be directly related to actual 
usage conditions. Also, the model must be such that 
measurements exhioit a high degree of reproducability over 
time and between different setups. rthile integrated cir- 
cuits may also be damaged by "self discharge" (such as by 
being dropped onto a grounded surface when statically 
charged), the capacitance of such circuits is small com- 
pared to that of the human body, and therefore the energy 
delivered by human discharge is far greater. This 
generally justifies its use as a sufficient and necessary 
test for a partic-ular protection scheme. 
2. GENERALIZED MODEL 
Various models of the human body have been proposed 
in the  literature.  While each description varies in its 
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exact details, it is generally agreed (see Appendix A for 
references) that the best network for modeling the human 
body is that of a charged capacitor, a series .resistor* 
and a relay-type switch as shown in figure I (see page 
II)'. In order to test this model, specific values of com- 
ponents must be determined. Because of the widely varying 
and conflicting details available in the literature and 
the resulting need for a justification of the model 
finally chosen, actual measurements of human capacitive 
and resitive parameters are necessary. 
A.  CAPACITANCE 
Human body capacitance was measured using a Keithley 
model 0I6 Digital electrometer. The technique.used was to 
charge a person to 100 volts and then discharge the sub- 
ject through the meter, while measuring the charge, in 
coulombs, delivered. Capacitance was then calculated 
using the expression: 
C = dQ/dV 
The results of a series of experiments involving body 
capacitance measurements of various subjects both in- 
sulated from and standing directly on ground can be found 
in Table 1 . These results agree very closely with values 
calculated (1,2,3) assuming that the body capacitance can 
be modeled in terms of two components. 
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TABLE I 
Measurements of Human Capacitance and Resistance 
b ject Body 
Cl ( 
Meas. 
Cap', 
pf) 
Calc. 
Foot 
C2 ( 
Meas. 
Cap. 
Pf) 
Calc. 
Wris 
Resist 
Dry 
t/Wrist 
. (K ohm) 
Wet 
A 106 96 74 47 28 3.2 
B 119 100 941* 545 50 2.2 
C 113 122 219 79 50 3.5 
D t 1 1 122 71 1 10 35.5 — 
E 105 105 425* 514 40 — 
F 109 96 75 90 19 —' 
G .112 95 76 78 55.8 — 
H 125 103 356* 554 29.5 4.7 
I 120 98 1070* 974 22 3.9 
J 10b 101 95 94 12.7 3.6 
•Subject wore shoes with thin leather soles (k=20) 
7 - 
The first component (Cl) is that due to the body's 
-isolation from the ground. It can be assumed that the 
body is similar to a sphere of the same surface area 
isolated from a ground plane. Hence this component of 
capacitance can be given (4) by: 
Cl = Q/V = 4V €0 H/(10xlO"U xluxio"* ) = 1.1H 
where H=the subjectxs height in centimeters. Measurements 
of this component, as recorded in Table 1, were made by 
insulating the subject from the floor by a non-conductive 
material of at least one foot in-thickness. 
The second component (C2) is due to the parallel 
plate capacitive effect of the body being in contact with 
a ground plate through the soles of the shoes. Values for 
C2 in Table 1 were derived by measuring total body 
capacitance 'of a person standing on a metal plate, and 
subtracting the value of Cl previously determined. This 
component can be expressed as* 
C2 = keoA/CtxIOxlO"'2- xlOxlO'2*) = 0.089kA/t 
where A=area (in square centimeters) of both shoe soles in 
contact with the floor, t=thickness of subjectvs shoe 
soles in centimeters, and k=dielectric constant of 
material comprising the shoe soles (5). If the sole and 
heel vary in thickness or composition, the formula must be 
modified accordingly. 
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If it is assumed that an average person is 175 cen- 
timeters tall, wears rubber soled shoes (K=6.6) that have 
a total bottom area of 3oO square centimeters and are one 
centimeter thick, then, 
Cl = I .1x175/2 = 95./ pf 
C2 = U.0d9xo .6x360/1 = 2.1 1 .5 pf 
or the total body capacitance iss 
Cb = Cl + C2 = 307 pf 
If we assume that the flooring material used in the 
handling environment is non-conductive, a more typical 
value may be 100 to 200 picofarads. For the purposes of 
testing, a value of 150 picofarads was chosed which 
represents an upper limit of Cl only. 
B.  RESISTANCE 
The second component examined in the search for an 
accurate human model was that of body series resistance. 
Data from the literature as tabulated in Appendix A in- 
dicate that previously published values of this parameter 
range from zero to 10K ohms. Methods of measurement range 
from direct DC bridge measurements to computation from 
human discharge waveforms. While the latter has the ad- 
vantage that its dynamic nature more* closely matches ac- 
tual discharge conditions, it suffers from the disadvan- 
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tage that other unknown parameters (such as switch charac- 
teristics, rise time, etc.) also enter into the calcula- 
tions, affecting the result substantially. Conversely, 
the DC measurements are direct, but are not as closely 
related to the actual problem. 
Table 1 (page /) gives the wrist to wrist resistance 
values of several subjects, measured using a laooratory- 
grade volt-ohin-meter . Measurements were taken by having 
the subjects first hold large, dry copper electrodes, and 
secondly by having them hold electrolyte-impregnated elec- 
trodes. The vast difference in these readings prooably 
explains the variety of published values in Appendix A. 
Similarly, the magnitude of these values seem to indicate 
that those measurements were taken using electrolyte- 
impregnated body contacts. This does not seem reasonable, 
however, since few people will handle integrated circuits 
with such contacts. Most problems in the field will 
surely be traceable to touch oy a person with dry or, at 
worst, moderately moist finger tips. Hence, while in- 
dividual values vary greatly for different conditions 
(humidity, skin conditions, etc.), a series resistance of 
about 20K ohms was chosen for future experiments. 
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C.  VOLTAGE USED 
Just as with other parameters previously discussed, 
published ideas on the voltage to which a person can be 
charged to under various conditions varies greatly (from 
one to 30 kilovolts . ..see Appendix A). These values were 
verified using a Sweeney Model .1127 Static Meter. For ex- 
ample, it was found that in low humidity situations 
several tens of kilovolts can be generated and maintained 
on the human oody by simply walking across a rug. Even 
friction of loose clothing rubbing against the body can 
develop suostantial voltages, depending on the nature of 
the fabric (6) . 
Since the, purpose of an MOS integrated circuit 
protection device is to isolate input circuitry from 
static electric voltages of these magnitudes, test 
procedures should ideally stress inputs to within this 
range. As of this writing, however, no protective 
networks have been found effective to voltage levels 
greater than five kilovolts. In actuality, however, two 
to three kilovolts may represent an upper limit on human 
static voltage levels in over 90% of all cases (7). 
Therefore, protection schemes should be tested to at least 
this range, and greater only as changes in technology oc- 
cur'. In any case, protective schemes which fail below 
about one kilovolt must be regarded as inadequate. 
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D.  HUMAN Sri ITCH CHARACTERISTICS 
The final part of the human body model to be in- 
vestigated is the switching mechanism which takes place 
when the body discharges into an integrated circuit. 
Several published testing techniques indicate use of high 
speed mercury-wetted relays (7,8,9). However, such 
switches often suffer from substantial leakage when "offa,» 
that is, much charge may be dissipated from the capacitor 
before the relay is energized (see figure 1). 
Clearly, the switch used in the model should, as 
closely as possible, reproduce the effects which occur 
when a human touches a circuit package directly. Exten- 
sive examination of waveforms of human static electric 
discharge into an integrated circuit have indicated that 
the human switch "bounces-" several times before makirjg^ 
final contact. Discharge measurements were made into a 
five picofarad capacitor to simulate the input impedance 
of an integrated circuit. Figures 2 through 5 are oscil- 
loscope photographs of these waveforms for the case where 
a human touches the lead directly, where a human touches 
the lead with a metal object, and the corresponding 
waveforms of equivalent discharge by a high speed vaccuum 
switch and a high voltage relay. In each case, a 
photograph of the initial pulse is included indicating 
circuit speed requirements.  Note that the high voltage 
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High 
Voltage* 
Aajustable 
Power Supply 
High Voltage 
Relay 
charge 
To input 
of circuit 
under test 
test 
t 
V 
1 
-wv— 
IOM ohms 
 N/W- 
20K ohms 
150 pf. 
Capacitor 1 
Jumper may be 
included if SPST 
relay is used 
To Power 
Supply Leads 
(including 
substrate) 
of circuit 
under test 
*V > 0 for P type substrate 
V < 0 for N type substrate 
Figure 1.  Equivalent Circuit for 
Human Static Electric Discharge 
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+3Kv 
+2iCv 
-HKv 
0 
^msec  4msec  omsec  amsec 
+ 3,<v 
+2£v 
+ IKv 
U 
0  .Insec ,2msec .Jmsec .4msec 
Figure 2  Naverorms or static discharge of human 
(charged to three kilovolts) touching integrated 
circuit lead directly 
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*3Kv 
+2i<v 
+ IKv 
0 
10msec   20msec   30msec   40rnsec 
+3Kv 
+2Kv 
0  .Imsec .2msec .3msec .4msec 
Figure 3  Waveforms of static discharge of human 
(charged to three kilovoits) touching integrated 
circuit lead with a metal object 
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+2Kv 
+ IKv 
2msec  4msec  6msec  bmsec 
+JKv 
+ZI\V 
+ IKv 
0 
HH 
, »■■?- 
,,r,. 
..<f 
! 
4- 
^ ■ ■ >; 
--, r 
0  .Imsec .2msec .3msec .4msec 
Figure 4  Waveforms of static discharge of human 
equivalent circuit using a high-speed relay 
+3.<v 
+2Kv 
+ IKv 
0 
U 2msec     4msec     6msec     dmsec 
+3Kv 
-+2RV 
+ IKv 
U 
0 '.Im'S'ec .2msec .3msec ,4msec 
Figure 5  Waveforms of static discharge of human 
equivalent circuit using ordinary high 
voltage relay 
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relay more closely resembles the human discharge than does 
the high speed vaccuum switch. In all photographs, the 
slow discharge is due to the high input impedance of the 
measuring circuitry. These figures also show that the ex- 
tent of the "bouncing41 which occurs ranges from one mil- 
lisecond to almost 30 milliseconds if the circuit is 
touched with a metal object held in the hand. These ex- 
tremely long times may be somewhat justified by con- 
sidering the rough and shaky nature of the human hand. If 
the impedance of the protection circuitry is small, 
clearly all  charge would  be  dissipated  in the  first 
bounce. 
As a result of these experiments, it seems that the 
use of high speed or mercury wetted switches are not in- 
dicated. Even the rise time of the initial pulse 
delivered to the circuit by a human is on the order of 
that of conventional high-voltage mechanical relays. The 
use of a series resistor in the model does not effect rise 
time but merely serves to limit current flow when the 
relay has closed. Since the latter generally suffer from 
contact bounce problems too, they seem the logical choice 
for human circuit modeling and have therefore been chosen 
for if. 
Qne other factor deserves mentioning here. The vol- 
tages described thus far are sufficient to cause ioniza- 
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/ 
tion of the air resulting in the formation of an elec- 
trical arc. The characteristics of such an arc include 
negative resistance (10). When high voltage discharge is 
made into low impedance (<I0K ohm) integrated circuits* 
the negative resistance of the arc is sufficient to tem- 
porarily cause current flow in the opposite direction from 
that forced by the charged capacitor. Appendix B further 
describes this phenomenon which has been observed in the 
laboratory during contact bounce. 
3.   TESTING of the MODEL 
The completed model of the body is shown in figure 
I. In order to test its validity, the inputs of several 
readily available four-input NAND MDS integrated circuits 
were stressed using successively higher voltages until 
failure occurred. Failure was indicated by a change in 
input characteristic as measured by a curve tracer. Al- 
most all failures were catastrophic short circuits; hence, 
there was little difficulty in determining the voltage at 
which it occured. The results of the comparison between 
destruction by actual human touch and the human model as 
determined by the experiment are shown in Table 2 . A 
close correlation of the model to actual direct human 
destruction is noted. Since destruction occurs at about 
40%  higher voltages  for the model  than  for  static 
- 19 - 
TABLE 2 
Comparison of Actual Human Body 
and Electrical Model Destructive Voltages 
Circuit    Direct Human Discharge Equiv. Circuit 
1 1500 1200 
2 1550 1450 
3 1180 1270 
4 1500 1300 
5 1670 2 000 
6 1750 1250 
7 2500 1500 
b                                             2670 1170 
9 2430 . 1430 
10 3300 1670 
Averages             2000±680 1420±250 
Note: Above voltages are averages for each circuit 
and have been normalized for human destruction with a 
hand-held metal ooject at one kilovolt. 
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discharge with a hand-held metal object, the test voltages 
used should be derated for direct correlation to the 
problem of human interaction. Hence, if a circuit is 
tested to one kilovolt using the model in figure I, it 
will be effective to only about 700 volts in protecting 
against stress with a hand-held metal object. In com- 
parison, direct discharge by human contact will cause 
failure at voltages which are about 40% higher than those 
used in the model . Comparison of the waveforms in figures 
2 through 5 support these experimental conclusions. 
- 21 - 
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III.  REQUIREMENTS OF A PROTECTION SCHEME 
I. ELECTRICAL 
The characteristics of a protection scheme must meet 
certain specific electrical criteria if it is to be effec- 
tive. These criteria involve initial reponse time, subse- 
quent restressings, maximum sustainable voltage, and total 
energy dissipation. 
If the input capacitance of a typical integrated cir- 
cuit is taken to be about five picofarads, then little 
voltage is lost by the 150 picofarad human source in 
charging up the integrated circuit to its voltage. As- 
suming a human series resistance of 20K ohm, the protec- 
tive circuit must then react in* 
t -= RC = (5XIO"'2" )x(20xl03) = 100 nanoseconds 
Note that if a lower limit of IK ohm is used as human 
source resistance, this time is cut by a factor of 20 to 
five nanoseconds. Hence, the protection scheme must be 
fast. 
It has previously been mentioned that typical static 
electric discharges may take the form of a series of 
rapidly recurring pulses due to a form of human contact 
bounce'. This problem must also be considered in designing 
an effective scheme. 
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Once contact bounce has stopped, the protection 
network must then be able to withstand the continued 
discharge of the human through substrate or power supply 
lines. Using 150 picofarads, charged to two kilovolts, 
the energy removed would be on the order of: 
I/2CV  = l/2( I50xl0*'2')x(2x]03)  = 4xl0~* joules 
Considerations of circuLt, over-heating and subsequent 
destruction at this and higher voltages common in working 
environments must be made (see reference 11). 
2.  MECHANISMS GF DESTRUCTION AND CIRCUIT LIMITATIONS 
Of equal importance in the design of an effective gate- 
protection scheme as the protection requirements discussed 
above, are the mechanisms by which failure occurs. Al- 
though each proposed network will surely fail for dif- 
ferent specific reasons, certain important generalizations 
can be made regarding the nature of these failures. 
The commonly used gate dielectric material for MOS 
integrated circuits is thermally-grown silicon dioxide 
having a breakdown voltage on the order of 8x10 
volts/centimeter (11,12). Hence, for commonly used gate 
oxide thicknesses of about 1000 angstroms, 80 volts may be 
sufficient to destroy this gate insulation material and 
render the circuit useless'. Klein  (11) has  shown  that 
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this breakdown is most 1ikely to occur at flaws in. the 
dielectric and occurs at lower voltages when thermal in- 
stabilities are present. Careful processing can reduce 
this problem significantly. Using silicon nitride as a 
gate dielectric instead of silicon dioxide allows somewhat 
higher breakdown voltages (13). This material, however, 
must also be protected for certain common voltage levels. 
In addition to oxide destruction, or as a cqnsequence 
of it, junction leakage may be increased by static stress 
causing a circuit to fail specifications even though it is 
functionally operational. These effects are similar to 
the melt transition caused by second breakdown of a p-n 
Junction (14). Freeman and Beall (15) have also observed 
damage due to -"microdi ffusion-" of dopants caused by high 
density breakdown currents. 
Other mechanisms which may be responsible for circuit 
failures due to static electric overstress, although 
rarely seen, include actual metal destruction. This 
catastrophic failure is usually a result of severe over- 
heating of the device or unexpected on-circuit electrical 
arcing. internal protection against these extremes is 
difficult and might be better accomplished by external 
controls. 
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3.  TECHNOLOGICAL RESTRICTIONS 
Technology plays an important role in protection re- 
quirements. Protective networks should be designed using 
already present processing steps. A more complicated 
process to provide basic input protection may not be 
economical. Since the choice of processing technology 
(CMOS, PMOS, NMUS, SiGate, etc.) is based on circuitry 
performance requirements, protective schemes must be 
available as part of each process. The use of low sub- 
strate resistivity material using epitaxial processing, if 
available, will significantly improve current carrying 
capability of any protective scheme. In addition, circuit 
speed or size requirements may restrict usage of certain 
networks, forcing custom modifications of protection 
devices where necessary. 
In general, any protective device used should be 
fabricated utilizing existing technology, should be of 
minimal size, and should not adversely affect circuit 
speed'. 
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IV.  PROTECTIVE SCHEMES 
In thje previous sections, the problem of input 
protection was explained, electrical and technological 
restrictions were defined, and possible destructive 
mechanisms were identified. A protective network remains 
to be described which will be effective in protecting the 
very circuitry out of which it is, itself, fabricated'. 
Various attempts to solve this paradoxical problem have 
been made in the past several years and are described 
below. 
1.  RESISTOR 
Perhaps the simplest of all protective networks, yet 
the basis of even the most complex, is the input resistor 
as shown in figure 10. The purpose of this device is to 
limit current flow into the active circuitry (16). When 
fabricated from non-diffused material (such as 
polysilicon), so that no parasitic diode results, it is of 
little value. To be effective, it must be combined with a 
device which will prevent the gate voltages from reaching 
destructive levels. While the resistor may be small in 
area requirements, it may adversely affect circuit speeds 
due to the J,RCJI time delay constant. 
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^PUT  PAD 
J, 
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WINDOW                                            METAL 
Figure 6 Circuit layout of resistor 
input protection network 
INPUT PAD 
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Figure 7  Circuit layout of diode 
input protection network 
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Figure d Circuit layout of resistor/diode 
combination protection network - 
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2.  DIODE 
Another common protective device is the input diode 
(shown in figure II). In the forward direction* the diode 
forms an excellent low-impedance current path. During 
normal operation, the diode is reverse biased and subse- 
quently has little effect on the operation of the cir- 
cuitry'. Fabrication must be such, however, that the 
reverse breakdown voltage of the diode is less than that 
of the gate oxide. This device combines the advantage of 
small size with minimal increase in delay time'. When used 
alone, however, it is itself easily destroyedeby excess 
currents and hence is not very effective. 
3'.  RESISTOR/DIODE COMBINATION 
By combining the previous two schemes, as shown in 
figure 8, a much more effective network is obtained. The 
resistor is used to limit current flow while the diode, 
whose reverse breakdown voltage is less than the oreakdown 
voltage of the gate oxide, protects the latter from 
destruction. This idea has been found to be most effec- 
tive if the resistor is diffused, so that, in effect, it 
also becomes a diode. The benefit in delay time resulting 
from the use of a deposited polysilicon input resistor in 
no way compensates for the loss in protective capability 
due to the absence of the associated diode. The value of 
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the input resistor used depends on the breakdown impedance 
of th diode. If the diode has a resistance to substrate 
(Rs) of 25 ohms under these conditions, and protection is 
desired to five kilovolts (Vprot) when the breakdown vol- 
tage (Vod) across the diode is limited to 50 volts, then 
the value of the input resistor (Rin) can be found by vol- 
tage division: 
Rin = (Vprot - Vbd)xRs/Vbd 
Rin = (5Kv - 50)x(25)/50 
Rin = 2 .5K ohm 
Further discussion of this scheme is given by Len- 
zinger (13). 
When the technology used allows back to back diodes 
(such as with CMOS processes), as shown in figure 9, the 
current handling capability is greatly increased since 
protection is accomplished in both directions through the 
use of forward biased diodes'. Results In Appendix E show 
that this technique is very effective, but is limited in 
its applications. Speed and area requirements for this 
network are moderate, making it a desirable, although not 
ideal, solution. 
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4.  FIELD PLATE DIODE 
As previously mentioned, in order to provide proper 
protection using a resistor/diode network, the diode 
reverse breakdown voltage must be less that that of the 
MOS gate oxide. Une method of lowering the breakdown of a 
diode made from the source and drain diffusion, which 
should typically be 90 volts, is by use of a field-aided 
breakdown design (17). The idea, as shown in figure 10, 
is to coat the p-n junction with a thin oxide layer and to 
overlay it with a metal electrode attached to. the sub- 
strate. The appropriate breakdown value can be obtained 
by varying the thickness of the dielectric under the elec- 
trode. Using the same dielectric as the gate of MOS 
devices, a value of about 40 volts is generally achieved. 
Although this device is simple, since the reduction in 
breakdown voltage occurs in such a small region, the 
series resistance of the device is high. In addition, the 
breakdown is prone to "walkout" when stressed, which 
raises' the breakdown voltage of the diode and decreases 
the protective capability against further stress. Ex- 
perimentally, "walkout" is easily observed as a slow in- 
crease in breakdown voltage while the reverse "IV" charac- 
teristic is being observed. Results shown in Appendix E 
indicate that this protective technique, used alone, is 
not sufficient to provide adequate protection. 
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5,'. THICK-OXIDE MOS TRANSISTOR 
A rarely used structure, shown in figure 11, is the 
thick oxide MOS diode. This device is simply an MOS tran- 
sistor whose gate, covered with thick oxide (e. g. 5000 
angstroms), is tied electrically to the inputv When an 
input voltage is high enough to induce a channel in the 
silicon under the thick oxide, the device will conduct to 
the sbbstrate. The disadvantages of this network are its 
low "onJI resistance, and high threshold voltage (100 
volts). Protection afforded by this device is poor. Note 
should be made of the fact that, in this device, adjacent 
diffusions are too far apart' to allow effective punch- 
through protection as described next. 
6'.  PUNCH-THROUGH DIODE 
A popular and effective protection device is the 
punch-through diode (16,17,18). In this device, under 
stress, current flows from one diffused area to another 
adjacent diffused area of the same conductivity type, 
which is held electrically at substrate potential. It is 
similar in appearance to the thick MOS transistor shown in 
figure .11 except that the channel length is much smaller'. 
Punch-through occurs when the input diffused region is 
reverse biased greatly enough so that its depletion region 
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extends to the other nearby diffused region. Sze provides 
an equation to permit calculation of the approximate vol- 
tage at which this effect occurs (19). For substrate 
doping (Nd) of 1x10 5 /cubic centimeter, and channel 
length (L) of ten microns* 
Vpt = L*qNd/2Es 
Vpt = 75.2 volts 
This technique is especially effective if the dif- 
fused regions are strapped with metal (i.e. covered and 
connected to the metal by windows) to avoid .resistive drop 
along them, and if the source diffusion is tied to the 
substrate bonding pad by a direct metal connection. In 
addition, experiments have shown that the use of a small 
.resistor (about IK ohm) in series with this device and the 
MOS circuitry provides greatly improved protection'. 
While consuming little area, the scheme may, however, in- 
troduce appreciaole capacitive delay. 
7'. GATED PUiMCH-fHROUGH DEVICE 
One of the most commonly used, most versatile, and 
most effective gate protection techniques is the gated 
punch-through device (16,18) as shown in figure 12. It is 
basically a combination of many of the best features of 
previously-described devices.  Incorporated in  it  are a 
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diffused input resistor, gate-enhanced p-n Junction re- 
gion, and a punch through device. The junction breakdown 
voltage is lowered by overlaying a polysilicon gate, which 
is itself protected by a small (500 to IK ohm) resistor 
before being tied to substrate. Closely spaced diffu- 
sions, cut by the polysilicon gate, form the punch- 
through device. These diffusions are strapped with metal 
to prevent resistive voltage drop. If the delay time of 
the input resistor cannot be tolerated, it may be 
eliminated. However, in this case it is necessary to in- 
clude a current limiting resistor between the source dif- 
fusion and substrate to prevent destruction of the 
network. The input pad should still include the initial 
large diffused region. This area acts as a diode, causing 
minor additional delay (usually tolerable), but providing 
substantial protection in the forward-bias region. 
8.  SPAtfK GAP DEVICE 
Lindholm and Plachy (7), and Coule (16) describe a 
protection technique using two closely spaced metal pads 
forming a spark-gap as shown in figure 13. Placement of 
the device should be before any input or additional 
protection circuitry. It may be implemented by locating 
bonding pads close to a substrate metalization encircling 
the integrated circuit chip. To prevent metal  to metal 
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shorts, the distance between metal here should be at least 
50 microns ("/). This device must be used in conjunction 
with a field plate diode, punch-through device, or similar 
network since it is effective only above 300 to 400 volts. 
To allow this voltage to develop, it must therefore be 
separated from the additional circuitry by a resistor. 
A requirement for implementation of this device, 
which may make it unsuitable for many applications, is 
that it requires a cavity package. That is, the area 
between the input and substrate ring must be left unpas- 
sivated so that the impedance of the gaseous discharge  is 
kept minimal . The use of certain hydrocarbon^base com- 
pounds as encapsulants (such as RTV) should be avoided 
since they may J,carbonizeJI and form a conductive path 
(short)'. Also, no other diffusions or metalization should 
be as close to the input as the spark gap device. 
Although this device may be effective initially, 
repetitive sparking will cause metal erosion and eventual 
failure. Coule (16) indicates that a combination protec- 
tive scheme including the spark gap device should be ef- 
fective to stress voltages greater the five kilovolts'. 
Although such structures appeared to be have been included 
on some of the integrated circuits tested, none withstood 
voltages to this level (see Table 3) . 
- 38 - 
9. OTHEtf TECHNIQUES 
Various other protection schemes have been developed, 
but most are not applicable except to specific circuits. 
The inclusion of zener diodes, having substantial reverse 
breakdown current carrying capabilities, is effective, but 
relies on special process steps for implementation. Such 
process techniques are not normally a part of MOS in- 
tegrated circuit fabrication and therefore are 
uneconomical to include. 
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V.. GENERAL LAYOUT COMMENTS AND TEST PROCDURES 
Taole 3 lists the results of static electric tests of 
protection schemes. The devices listed therein were 
tested using the circuit of figure I. Starting at -100 
volts (assuming N-type substrate material), the capacitor 
was discharged, at least five times into an input of the 
integrated circuit, whose power supply leads were all 
grounaed. A curve tracer was then used to test the result 
of each discharge by examining the circuitxs J,IV" charac- 
teristic.  The experiment was  then  repeated,  increasing 
the negative voltage at 100 volt intervals until the input 
characteristic was altered so as to make the circuit 
unusable. Failure was easy to recognize since an over- 
whelming majority were severely catastrophic short cir- 
cuits, rthile ideally the circuit should be functionally 
tested after each experiment, the time involved in this 
procedure is prohibitive. It was found in all cases that 
testing N-type substrate circuits with negative pulses was 
most destructive, and conversely for tests with positive 
pulses of P-type substrate circuits. 
It should be noted that for devices using field-plate 
diodes "walkout" was observed, as previously described. 
Iaputs were generally able to survive higher stress vol- 
tages if they were tested starting at a relatively small 
voltage and increasing that voltage  until destruction oc- 
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curred, rather than stressing an untested input initially 
at some high voltage. Hence, data in Table 3 may be high 
by 100 to 300 volts. The voltage by which successive 
tests were incremented was chosen small enough to give 
good resolution, yet large enough to minimize this effect'. 
Also, in some cases, a normal input characteristic could 
be restored by a second discharge after the first 
discharge "destroyed" the input. When this occured, only 
the final value was recorded, at which point the device 
was irreversibly damaged. 
Some input lines on certain circuits seemed to sur- 
vive better than others even though they.included iden- 
tical protective circuitry. These inputs were carefully 
visually inspected and the following layout procedures 
seem to be responsible for the desirable results: 
1. The input network must be protected by a series 
resistor, even if the input, itself, is taken directly 
from the bonding pad. The resistor must be large enough 
to prevent destruction of the network for input voltages 
in excess of ten kilovolts. input resistors as best in- 
cluded as long, thin diffused regions if the associated 
time delay can be tolerated. 
2.  Non-protected devices,  diffusions, and metal  lines 
should be kept away from the protective circuitry and 
bonding pad areas. 
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TABLE 3 
Test Results of Various 
Manufacturers Protection Networks 
Manufacturer Product Protection Device Destruct Volt" 
RCA 3031 Dual Zeners +1750+360 
Fairchild 3814 Gated Punch Through 
(Vss -resistor) 
-1530+150 
Intel 1702 Gated Punch Through 
(input resistor) 
-1480+270 
Mostek 4102 Punch Through 
(input resistor) 
+1430+220 
Intersil 7511 Gated Punch Through -1310+550 
Mostek 50250 Punch Through 
(no resistor) 
-J170+170 
RCA 4001 Dual Diode with 
diffused resistor 
-1160+120 
Intel 2101 Gated Punch Through +J150+530 
National 
National 
Intersil 
Fairchild 
Fairchild 
Motorola 
♦Voltage at 
(input resistor, 
no metal straps) 
5740   Field Plate Diode 
I 101    Field Plate Diode 
.7780   Gated Punch Through 
(small input resistor) 
3701   Diffused resistor 
3814   Gated Punch Through 
(no input resistor) 
14001   Diode 
which  input destruction occurred 
-940+250 
-620+190 
-580+90 
-460+70 
-450+100 
-180±40 
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3'. Where protective circuits must be positioned at some 
distance from the input pad, at least the input diffused 
resistor should be included as closely as possible to the 
input pad. Metal lines to this circuitry must be kept 
away from other lines or diffusions, especially from power 
supply lines. 
4. If a diode protection scheme is used, diffusions 
should be liberal in size. Regions of low resistivity 
near such diffusions, to act as charge collectors, are not 
nearly as important as a large emitter diode diffusion to 
substrate (see figure 7) . 
5. For effective implementation of a gated punch 
through device, care must be taken to prevent resistive 
voltage drop along the width of the channel. This may be 
accomplished by including metal -straps and windows over 
the tops of diffusions'. 
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VI . CONCLUSION 
A model of the human body for static electric stress- 
testing of MJS integrated circuits has been developed and 
verified by direct tests. The human body was found to be 
adequately represented for these purposes by a capacitor 
of about 150 picofarads, a series resistance of about 20K 
ohms, and an ordinary high voltage relay which purposely 
exhibits J,bounce" . Voltages at which circuitry was 
destroyed were found to be highly correlated between this 
model and actual human static discharge. The voltage 
level on the capacitor in the model should be increased by 
approximately 40% to accurately simulate protection 
against a charged human touching a circuit with a metal 
object. Conversely, protection against direct human con- 
tact will be simulated to 40% higher voltages than those 
used in the model . While voltages of up to 30 kilovolts 
can easily be developed on the human body, the common max- 
imum under normal conditions is two to three kilovolts'. 
The mechanisms of integrated circuit failure due to 
static electric over-stress have been identified as oxide 
breakdown, p-n junction destruction, and metal shorts. It 
was found that static destruction, in virtually all cases, 
caused a short circuit to substrate to occur on the input 
lead being tested. In some cases, a ''destroyed" input 
lead could be restored by restressing that  lead.  The 
- 44 - 
phenomenon of  "walkout" was observed especially where 
field plate diode protection was used. 
Various protection schemes have been described and 
tested. These include the input resistor, diode, 
resistor/diode combination, dual diode, field-plate diode, 
thick oxide MUS transistor, punch-through device, gated 
punch through device, and the spark gap. Several devices 
which consume much area, especially those including diodes 
with surrounding low resistivity charge collector regions, 
were found .very ineffective. A simple diffused resistor 
of IK to 2£  ohms provides more protection  in  much  less 
space. ; 
The most versatile and effective network is a gated 
punch-through device. Modifications to this device allow 
it to be used for both moderate protection or high speed 
applications by changing the nature of the input resistor'. 
The most effective device for situations where area is ex- 
tremely limited is simply a punch-through device with a 
series .resistor. However, this circuit introduces ap- 
preciably more capacitive delay time than the gated puch- 
through device. The inclusion of a spark gap, where 
possible, may extend the present protective limit of these 
circuits from two to three kilovolts to well beyond five 
kilovolts. 
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APPENDIX   A 
Hu man  Body Models 
Source 1 •ief# Res Cap Volt Energy RC 
Frank.   Inst'. 1 5K 500 20 100 2500 
Linholm &  Pla chy 7 0 250 15 28 0 
RCA  ST64lb 8 560 100 4 0.8 56 
Mines  Report 9 - J 00-300 10 5-20 — 
Lenzlinger 13 1 .5K ioo' 10 5 150 
Freeman &   Bea 11 15 2K 150 5-20 1.9-30 300 
Coule 16 IK 200 5 2'.5 200 
Mavor 17 - 100 — — — ■ 
Stephenson 20 1.5K    " 100 1 .5 0. 1 150 
Hamiter   . 21 — 200 5 2'.5 — 
Bendix,   Inc1. 22 100 218 3 1 22 
Speakman 23 I OK 60 10 3 600 
Motorola 24 — 300 15 34 — 
Petrick 25 25-60 200 30 90 5-.12 
Abbreviations* 
Res = body resistance in ohms 
Cap = oody capacitance in picofarads 
Volt = maximum voltage body may typically charge to 
Energy = mi Hi joules of energy delivered 
RC = time delay constant of discharge in nanoseconds 
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APPENDIX B 
Negative Resistance Characterisic of Electrical Arcs 
During contact bounce, a positive voltage (Vout) of 
about 10 to 30% of Vstress (where Vstress = -2 kilovolts) 
was observed across the device under test when its im- 
pedance (Rd) was less than about 10K ohm. The magnitude 
of Vout was proportional to 1/Rd near these conditions. 
If the arc developed across the switch is represented by a 
negative resistance, -Ra, then: 
Vout  = IRd 
I  = Vstress/(Rd + Rs - Ra) 
so, Vout  = Vstress/(Rd + Rs - Ra) 
if Rd + Rs < Ra, Vout varies as -Vstress, 
as observed! 
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